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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 1
Perhaps the most significant exception to the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment is the consent search, 2 which requires no warrant,
exigent circumstances, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion. 3
Some scholars have suggested that the Supreme Court's
voluntariness standard4  for determining consensual searches
misperceives the level of coercion inherent in almost any encounter
with the police.5 Certain state courts have taken measures beyond
those mandated by the Supreme Court to try to ensure that the
consent given is truly the product of the person's free will and not due
to any coercion.6 Some courts, legislatures, and police departments
have limited or banned consent searches following traffic stops,
mainly due to concerns over racial profiling.7
This Note argues that an element of privacy should be
considered in determining the validity of the consent given to a search
request. The element of privacy would be based on a person's
expectation of privacy in a particular location as determined by Fourth
Amendment case law. This change is necessary to bring the law of
1. U.S. CONT. amend. IV.
2. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 215-16
(2002).
3. Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L. Q. 175,
175 (1991).
4. The voluntariness standard requires that consent be given voluntarily and not as the
result of express or implied duress or coercion. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248
(1973). See infra text accompanying notes 86-113 (discussion of consent searches and the
Schneckloth case).
5. E.g., Strauss, supra note 2, at 238-44.
6. E.g., State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (Wash. 1998).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 231-236 (discussion of consent searches following
traffic stops).
FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
consent searches into congruence with the hierarchy of privacy
protections that are evident in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.8
Part II of this Note describes the primary cases determining
whether a search has occurred and how federal courts analyze consent
search cases. Part III describes state approaches to the different
contexts in which consent search issues arise. Part IV presents and
analyzes possible doctrinal bases for consent searches, and considers
aspects of the concept of voluntariness through reference to
psychological research. Part V argues in favor of considering privacy
in determining the validity of consent to search.
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CONSENT SEARCHES
This Part provides background information on the
fundamentals of the law of consent and searches. The first section
briefly traces the history of the law of searches. The second section
analyzes the landmark case of Katz v. United States.9 The third
section describes how the Court used the Katz framework to decide
cases presenting a variety of factual settings. The fourth section
analyzes a recent case, Kyllo v. United States,10 which may alter the
Katz framework. The final two sections analyze, respectively, the
basis of consent searches, including the landmark Supreme Court case
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte," and the factors that courts use to
determine voluntariness.
A. Common Law Trespass Test
The Supreme Court used a physical invasion test, 2 also
referred to as the trespass test, to decide early search cases. 13 In the
1928 case Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that wiretapping
did not amount to a search or seizure.14 To reach this result, the
8. "[Contemporary Fourth Amendment] jurisprudence analyzes issues under the aegis of
privacy." Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 825 (1999). For a
description of the hierarchy of privacy expectations and protections in different locations under
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see infra text accompanying notes 301-326.
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
11. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
12. Sean D. Thueson, Case Note, Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New "Bright-Line" Rule in
Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 WYO. L. REV. 169, 176 (2001).
13. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353; Bradley L. Leger, Case Note, Thermal Imaging and the Fourth
Amendment: The Government's "High-Assault" on a "Once Treasured Haven," 43 S. TEX. L. REV.
837, 842 (2001).
14. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
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Court focused on the absence of physical entry onto the defendant's
property. The Court stated, "The evidence was secured by the use of
the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses
or offices of the defendants." 15 The Court stated that no cases it cited
or that had been brought to its attention held the Fourth Amendment
to be violated unless there was "an official search and seizure of his
person or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects
or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage.' "16
B. Katz: The Demise of the Trespass Test?
Katz v. United States, decided in 1967, rejected the trespass
test and articulated a different analysis for search cases. 17 Katz was
convicted for transmitting wagering information by telephone in
violation of a federal statute.18 At trial, the government introduced
evidence of Katz's voice during telephone conversations which had
been overheard by FBI agents. 19  The agents had attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the public
telephone booth in which Katz conducted his conversations. 20 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed Katz's conviction, holding that there had been
no Fourth Amendment violation since " '(t)here was no physical
entrance into the area occupied by (the petitioner).' "21
Katz phrased the issues on certiorari as: (1) whether a public
telephone booth is a constitutionally protected area, so that the
evidence obtained violated the booth user's right to privacy, and (2)
whether physical penetration of a constitutionally protected area is
necessary before a search and seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment. 22 The Supreme Court "decline[d] to adopt [petitioner's]
formulation of the issues."23 The Court noted that both parties had
attached great significance to whether the phone booth was a
constitutionally protected area. 24 However, the Court stated that "the
15. Id. at 464. The Court also stated that "[t]he language of the amendment cannot be
extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world from the
defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or office .. " Id. at
465.
16. Id. at 466.
17. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
18. Id. at 348.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 348-49 (citing Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966)).
22. Id. at 349-50.
23. Id. at 350.
24. Id. at 351.
1282 [Vol. 58:4:1279
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Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."25  The majority
pointed out that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his office, is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, while what a
person attempts to keep private, even in public, may be protected. 26
The government noted that the telephone booth was constructed
partly of glass and Katz could be seen from outside; therefore he was
as visible inside the booth as he had been outside.27 The majority
dismissed this argument, stating that Katz intended to keep his words
private, not his actions, and that he was entitled to assume that his
words would not be broadcast to the world.28
Having determined that the interception of the telephone
conversations was a search and seizure, the Supreme Court then
considered whether the search complied with the Constitution.29 The
Court determined that the search would have been permissible with a
warrant, but that the warrantless search and seizure was
unreasonable and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment.30
Justice Harlan's concurrence presented a different
interpretation of the precedent. 3' He explained, "My understanding of
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. '"' 32 This
formulation, soon referred to as the Katz test 33, became the new
standard for the legitimacy of government searches. 34
One commentator has argued that Katz stands for the
proposition that courts should consider the results of the search and
not the method of the search.35 Professor Simmons admits that this
result is contrary to some recent cases interpreting Katz, but argues
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 352.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 354.
30. Id. at 356, 359.
31. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id.
33. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (critiquing the two-part Katz test).
34. Justice Harlan's test was eventually accepted by the Court. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(b) (4th ed. 2004) (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)); Reginald Short, Comment, The Kyllo Conundrum: A
New Standard to Address Technology that Represents a Step Backward for Fourth Amendment
Protections, 80 DENV. U. L. REV. 463, 467 (2002).
35. Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1306 (2002).
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that it is more consistent with the original intent of the case.36 He
states that advancing technology has led to inconsistent results in
search cases and to the gradual erosion of Fourth Amendment
protections. 37 He argues that using an approach based on results
instead of method will help alleviate these problems.38 Even the Court
recognized problems with the Katz test. Justice Harlan eventually
realized that the subjective expectation of the privacy prong could be
defeated if the government simply posted signs announcing
surveillance. While the test was never overruled, the Court has
recently criticized it. Moreover, some commentators have argued that
in the recent Supreme Court case Kyllo v. United States the Court
claimed to be applying Katz, but did not actually do so. 39
C. Post-Katz Developments
Following the Katz decision, the Supreme Court applied the
test set out in the Harlan concurrence to cases questioning whether
the government conduct at issue amounted to a search. For example,
Oliver v. United States held that an asserted expectation of privacy in
open fields is not an expectation that society recognizes as
reasonable.40 In California v. Greenwood, the Court held that there
was no search when the police examined garbage that had been left on
the curb.41 Emphasizing that garbage bags left on the curb are readily
accessible to members of the public, the Court stated that the garbage
was sufficiently exposed to defeat the defendants' claim to Fourth
Amendment protection.42 In later cases, the Court held that a luggage
sniff by a drug detection dog was not a search,4 3 but a squeeze of
luggage was a search.44
The Court in Florida v. Riley found that there was no search
where a police helicopter 400 feet off the ground viewed the inside of
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 335 (1998) (arguing that the overall
tendency of the Court has been to reduce individual protections in the face of advancing
technology), cited in Jeffrey W. Childers, Kyllo v. United States: A Temporary Reprieve from
Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 N.C. L. REV. 728, 739 (2003).
38. Simmons, supra note 35, at 1306.
39. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); infra note 79.
40. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984).
41. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
42. Id.
43. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
44. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
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defendant's greenhouse. 45 It noted that any member of the public
could have been where the police were, that there was no violation of
the law, and that "no intimate details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage were observed."46  In Dow Chemical v. United
States, the Court held that aerial photography of the company's
premises was not a search.47 It allowed that some surveillance with
devices not generally available to the public might be a search.48
However, the Court stated that the photographs at issue were not
sufficiently revealing of intimate details to raise constitutional
concerns.
49
D. Kyllo v. United States
In Kyllo v. United States, a government agent suspected that
Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home. 50 Agents used a thermal
imager to search for evidence of the high-intensity lamps typically
required for indoor marijuana cultivation.51 The agents performed the
scan from the agent's vehicle across the street from Kyllo's house.52 It
showed that the roof over the garage and a side wall were warmer
than the rest of the house and the other houses in the triplex.53 Based
on informant tips, utility bills, and the thermal imaging, a magistrate
issued a search warrant for Kyllo's home. 54 The search yielded 100
marijuana plants that were grown inside Kyllo's home.55
Kyllo attempted to have the evidence suppressed and entered a
conditional guilty plea. 56 The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part Katz
analysis of subjective and objective expectation of privacy.57 It held
that Kyllo lacked a subjective privacy expectation since he took no
affirmative action to conceal the waste heat emissions. 58  In its
analysis of objectively reasonable expectation, the court noted that a
45. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989).
46. Id. at 451-52.
47. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id.
50. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
51. Id. For a recreation of the scan, see David Schenk, Watching You, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC,
Nov. 2003, at 27.
52. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045-47 (9th Cir. 1999).
58. Id. at 1046. In this analysis, the Court analogized the waste heat to the odor emitted by
illicit drugs detected by a trained police dog in Place. Id. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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heightened privacy expectation in the home has been recognized for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.59 However, it also stated that
activities within a residence are not protected from outside, non-
intrusive government observation merely because they are confined to
the home. 60 The court believed that the crucial inquiry for whether
technology was used for an impermissible warrantless search was
whether the technology had revealed "intimate details."'61 Based on
this standard of objective reasonableness, the Ninth Circuit held that
the scan did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life, and
accordingly there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. 62
The Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, reversed the Court of
Appeals decision.63  It stated that the Katz test has often been
criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable. 64 The
Court held that it believed "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search-at least where
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."65
The majority rejected the position of the dissent and the government
that since the imager only detected heat radiating off of the external
surface, the technique should be upheld.66 It noted that such a
mechanical interpretation of the reasonable expectation of privacy test
was rejected in Katz since the device only detected sound waves that
reached the exterior of the phone booth.67
The majority also emphasized that it was important to the
holding that the area imaged was Kyllo's home. 68 The Court also
rejected the contention that the imaging was constitutional since it did
not reveal private activities in private areas.69 It stated, "In the home,
59. Id. at 1046 (citing Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 n.4 (1986)).
60. Id. at 1046-47 (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
61. Id. at 1047. For this proposition, the court cited United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850,
855 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238).
62. Id. at 1047. The court noted, "Like the Court in Dow Chemical, we reject Kyllo's
attempt to rely on 'extravagant generalizations' about the potential invasions of privacy that this
sort of advanced technology may someday present. Id. (quoting Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 239).
63. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41 (2001).
64. Id. at 34. For this proposition, the majority cited multiple authorities including Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 35.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 34 (emphasizing that there is a "ready criterion.., of the minimal expectation
of privacy" when a home is involved); supra text accompanying note 65 (noting the Court's
concern about gaining information from a home's interior with technology not publicly available).
69. Id. at 37.
1286 [Vol. 58:4:1279
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our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire
area is held safe from prying governmental eyes. '70 The majority
rejected the dissent's standard, stating, "The people in their houses, as
well as the police, deserve more protection."71  Further, the Court
reiterated, "We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm
line at the entrance to the house.'"72 This focus on the home seems to
go further than previous cases in determining that a search has
occurred.
The dissent favored an approach that would uphold the search
since it simply gathered information exposed to the public from the
outside of the home.7 3 The dissent pointed out that the imaging "did
not accomplish 'an unauthorized physical penetration into the
premises' . . . .74 The dissent analogized the imager to a device in the
Katz scenario that would only pick up the volume of sound that left
the booth, which was available to the public.7 5 The device in Katz,
unlike the thermal imager, allowed the police to obtain information
otherwise available only to those in the private area. 7 6 The dissent
also pointed out that conditioning protection on whether the device is
in general public use would lead to an increasing threat to privacy as
the use of advanced surveillance equipment becomes more prevalent. 77
Several commentators have criticized the Kyllo decision for
misapplying Katz, 78 while some argue that the Court did not apply
Katz at all.7 9 Others have criticized the decision for not providing
sufficient guidance for future decisions in the lower courts about the
term "device not in general public use."80 The Supreme Court has not
70. Id. (emphasis in original).
71. Id. at 39.
72. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
73. Id. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509
(1961)).
75. Id. at 49-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority, however, was clearly concerned with
this problem. "The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy." Id. at 34. The majority showed concern
with the advancement of technology. "While the technology used in the present case was
relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or in development." Id. at 36.
78. Childers, supra note 37, at 754.
79. Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice
Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1022 (2001) ("More importantly, the Kyllo
majority did not apply the Katz test to the case before it.").
80. Short, supra note 34, at 481 (citing Sarilyn E. Hardeee, Why the United States Supreme
Court's Ruling in Kyllo v. United States is Not the Final Word on the Constitutionality of
Thermal Imaging, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 53, 69 (2001); Thueson, supra note 12, at 192-95)
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established a standard or definition for this term. The threat to
privacy is likely to "grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive
equipment becomes more readily available."81  Other commentators
have criticized the Court's reversion to a property-based standard as it
failed to provide courts with sufficient guidance on how to evaluate
facts presenting technologies which do not operate in a fashion
analogous to a physical invasion.8 2
Another criticism of Kyllo is that the opinion reached beyond
the facts of the case by basing the result on technologies that will be
developed in the future and, in this respect, the Court failed to
exercise judicial restraint.83 However, this critique conflicts with their
expectations of a rule that defines a standard addressing the
application of new technologies.8 4 It is difficult to formulate a rule for
new technologies without anticipating the new technologies. If the
rule announced by the Court is limited to the facts of one case, it will
be of little use when applied to new technologies.8 5
E. Consent Searches: Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
The fundamental case analyzing the constitutionality of
consent searches is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.s6 In Schneckloth,
police stopped an automobile with six passengers because the car's
headlight and the license plate light had burned out. 7 The driver was
unable to produce a driver's license, and only one of the five other
81. Thueson, supra note 12, at 193-95 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
82. Short, supra note 34, at 483.
83. Childers, supra note 37, at 755 (citing Thueson, supra note 12, at 201); Short, supra
note 34, at 482 (citing same). But see LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.2(d) (applauding the Court for
not waiting until technologies become more advanced); Childers, supra note 37, at 755 (same).
84. Thueson, supra note 12, at 202; Short, supra note 34, at 485.
85. One commentator supports advancing carefully in announcing new principles:
The Supreme Court ordinarily must decide the case before it. It must do so even
though it is not prepared to announce the new principle in terms of comparable
generality with the old, still less to say how much the old must be displaced and
whether or how the old and new can be accommodated. If the Court declines to give
birth to the new principle, it will never acquire the experience or the insight to answer
these latter questions. If it attempts to answer them at the moment of the new
principle's birth, it is not likely to answer them wisely. Clarity and consistency are
desirable, certainly, to the extent that they can be achieved. But the temptation to
achieve them by ignoring the complex and the unpredictable quality of real problems
is fortunately less beguiling to Justices perennially faced with responsibility for
solving those problems than to the Justices' academic critics.
LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.1(b) (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 352 (1974)).
86. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
87. Id. at 220.
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men, Joe Alcala, had a license.88 Alcala explained that the car
belonged to his brother.8 9 After the officer asked the men to exit the
car and two additional policemen arrived, the officer asked Alcala for
permission to search the car, and Alcala responded, "Sure, go ahead." 90
Alcala helped the police search by opening the trunk and glove
compartment. 91 No one was threatened with arrest and the officer
testified that the encounter was "very congenial." 92 The police found
stolen checks in the automobile. 93
The checks were admitted into evidence in Bustamonte's trial,
and he was convicted. 94 The state appellate court applied a consent
test that considered whether the consent was voluntary in light of all
the circumstances. 95 The Court found that the circumstances
suggested that the consent was in fact voluntary. 96 On appeal of the
district court's denial of Bustamonte's federal habeus corpus claim,
the Ninth Circuit set aside the district court's order. 97 The court
stated that the state was obliged to demonstrate that the consent had
been given with an understanding that it could be freely and
effectively withheld; absence of coercion and a verbal expression of
consent would not suffice. 98
The Supreme Court stated the inquiry in the case as follows:
"what must the state prove to demonstrate that consent was
'voluntarily' given."99 First, the Court agreed with the California state
courts that the voluntariness of consent is to be determined by the
totality of the circumstances.100 The Court considered the ambiguity
of the very concept of "voluntariness" to be a particularly difficult
issue.10 1 It then stated that "[w]hile knowledge of the right to refuse
consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need
not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 221.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.at 221-22.
99. Id. at 222.
100. Id. at 224.
101. Id. The Court noted that all statements are "voluntary" in the sense of representing a
choice of alternatives. Id. However, if the voluntariness incorporates a question of whether the
statement would have been made even absent inquiry, then virtually no statements would be
voluntary. Id. For a criticism of the concept of voluntariness, see infra Part IlI.C.
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consent."10 2 If the state must prove that the subject of the search
knew that he had a right to refuse consent, there would be serious
doubt whether law enforcement could continue to conduct consent
searches.103
The Supreme Court also considered an alternative, which it
stated would go far toward proving knowledge of the right to refuse
consent: obligating governmental agents to advise the subject of a
search that he has the right to refuse.10 4 The Court rejected that
approach, noting that it had been almost universally rejected by other
authorities. 10 5 The Court found it impractical to introduce these
warnings, claiming that an effective warning would necessitate
detailed requirements.'0 6  Consent searches are part of standard
investigatory techniques; the situations in which they are used are a
"far cry" from trial and "immeasurably far removed" from "custodial
interrogation" where warnings are required.10 7
The Court then considered the claim that consent is a waiver of
a person's rights and the state must, under the doctrine of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 08  demonstrate "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."'0 9 However, the majority
distinguished this doctrine, explaining that it generally applied in the
context of the protection of a defendant's right to a fair trial, not in the
context of the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures. 10 The Court stated that its holding was a
narrow one: when the subject of a consent search is not in custody, the
state must "demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily
given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.""'
The dissent claimed that consent cannot be considered a
meaningful choice unless the subject was aware of the right to refuse
consent." 2  Based on evidence that the FBI had a longstanding
practice of warning suspects and that there was no suggestion from
102. Id. at 227.
103. Id. at 229. But see id. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the FBI had for
many years informed subjects of their right to refuse consent and that reported cases suggested
that where police had informed subjects the warning had not disrupted the casual flow of
events).
104. Id. at 231.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 232.
108. Johnston v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
109. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
110. Id. at 235-241.
111. Id. at 248.
112. Id. at 284-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reported cases that warning subjects of their rights had disrupted the
casual flow of events, the dissent believed that nothing disastrous
would result from requiring warnings. 113
F. Factors in the Voluntariness Analysis
Courts have considered multiple factors in deciding whether
consent is voluntarily given. Those factors include (1) "claim of
authority",114 (2) "show of force and other coercive surroundings",1 5 (3)
"threat to seek or obtain a search warrant",116 (4) "prior illegal police
action",117 (5) "maturity, sophistication, physical, mental or emotional
state",118 (6) "prior or subsequent refusal to consent",119 (7) "confession
or other cooperation", 120 (8) "denial of guilt",12' (9) "warning or
113. Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(a) (4th ed. 2004). If there is an express
or implied false claim that the officers can immediately search in any event, it is likely that there
will be a finding of no consent. Id.
115. Id. § 8.2(b). It is unlikely that one coercive factor will invalidate consent, but several in
combination likely will. Id. Further, in an otherwise close case of consent, a single coercive
element may well invalidate consent. Id.
116. Id. § 8.2(c). Courts have experienced "considerable difficulty" in this situation. Id.
Threat to seek a warrant is less likely to invalidate consent. Id. Threat to obtain a search
warrant is less likely to invalidate consent if police then had probable case, while it is likely to
invalidate consent if there were not grounds upon which a warrant could issue. Id.
117. Id. § 8.2(d). For this factor, some courts use a totality of the circumstances
voluntariness test, while other analyze the facts under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Id.
118. Id. § 8.2(e). Courts take account of these conditions at the time consent was given, and
are less likely to find valid consent the more immature and impressionable the subject of the
search. Id.
119. Id. § 8.2(f). Prior refusals to consent are properly taken into account as a factor,
although their relative weight may depend upon "the reasons underlying it as they relate to the
subsequent police efforts." Id. For example, in United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th
Cir. 1974), when the defendant refused consent because he did not own the private plane he had
arrived on, it was proper for the agents to repeat their request as to his personal belongings on
the plane. Id.
120. Id. § 8.2(g). It is more likely that consent will be obtained after a valid confession,
whether it is "an admission that highly incriminating evidence is in fact located in the place
which the police now wish to search" or when the confession "is simply an acknowledgement by
the person that he committed the crime which the police are investigating." Id. "Similarly, other
information tending to show why the person, at the time of the consent, believed it advantageous
to cooperate with the police is also highly relevant." Id. "Courts also tend to attach significance
to the post-consent cooperation of the consenting party in facilitating the search." Id.
121. Id. § 8.2(h). The court in Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954), held
that "a consent is inherently involuntary if it was given by a person denying his guilt but the
search resulted in the discovery of highly incriminating evidence." Id. However, the Higgins
approach has not gained general acceptance. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:4:1279
awareness of Fourth Amendment rights",122  (10) "Miranda
warnings", 123 (11) "right to counsel", 124 (12) "implied' consent by
engaging in certain activity", 125 (13) "deception as to identity",' 26 and
(14) "deception as to purpose."127
In Bumper v. North Carolina, the Court held that a consent
search cannot be justified "when that 'consent' has been given only
after the official conducting the search has asserted that he possesses
a warrant." 128 Whether the suspect was in custody is also relevant. In
United States v. Watson, the Court held that failure to warn the
defendant "is not to be given controlling significance" where the
defendant "had been arrested and was in custody, but his consent was
given while on a public street, not in the confines of the police
station."129  In Gentile v. United States, the Court denied certiorari
122. Id. § 8.2(i). The Court held in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), that
knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account in the voluntariness inquiry,
but does not have to be proven by the prosecution. Id.
123. Id. § 8.2(j). The prevailing view is that it is not necessary that a consent to search
during a custodial interrogation be preceded by a Miranda warning. Id.
124. Id. § 8.2(k). It is more likely that the right to counsel argument will be stronger once
adversary judicial proceedings have been instituted against the defendant, since this situation is
"closer to others in which the Court has recognized a right to counsel." Id. Still, "[e]ven if the
circumstances are such that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the time that a
person is asked to consent to a search, it would be highly relevant under the Schneckloth
voluntariness test that the consent was obtained following a police refusal to grant the person's
request to consult with counsel." Id.
125. Id. § 8.2(1). Courts have upheld searches where the person allegedly consenting never
explicitly stated his consent. For example, the Supreme Court justified official inspections of
business premises by stating that the 'businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to
the restrictions placed upon him." Id. (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973)). Airport searches and jail visitor searches where signs announce that all passengers or
visitors were subject to search have been upheld. Id.
126. Id. § 8.2(m). In this situation the police seeking consent use deceit or
misrepresentation. Id. The Supreme Court decisions "collectively appear to support the
following proposition: when an individual gives consent to another to intrude into an area or
activity otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment, aware that he will thereby reveal to this
other person either criminal conduct or evidence of such conduct, the consent is not vitiated
merely because it would not have been given but for the nondisclosure or affirmative
misrepresentation which made the consenting party unaware of the other person's identity as a
police officer or police agent." Id.
127. Id. § 8.2(n). This is the situation where a known official "engage[s] in deception which
leads the consenting party to conclude that the official's objective is other than criminal
prosecution or that the official's objective relates to a form of criminal activity different from that
which actually prompted the official to seek consent. Id. In these cases there is often a "case-by-
case assessment of the 'fairness' of the deception used by law enforcement agents in concealing
their true purpose." Id.
128. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
129. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976). See also YALE KAMISAR ET AL.,
BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 339 (10th ed. 2002) (discussing
custody as a factor in determining validity of consent).
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where the defendant was given Miranda warnings but not Fourth
Amendment warnings before consent was obtained. 130 According to
the Court, the subject of the search has the ability to control the scope
of the search. 131 The standard for determining the scope of a subject's
consent is "that of objective reasonableness-what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
officer and the suspect?"'13 2
A recent case considered the consent search issue in the
context of the search of a bus. In United States v. Drayton, officers
boarded a bus bound from Ft. Lauderdale to Detroit during a
stopover.133 Drayton's companion, Brown, agreed to a search of his
person and was arrested after the officers found drug packages.' 34 An
officer then asked Drayton for consent to search him, to which
Drayton responded by "lifting his hands about eight inches from his
legs."13 5  The officer found packages of cocaine on Drayton and
arrested him.1 36
The Court ruled that the encounter had been a voluntary
one. 137 The Court stated that nothing the officer said indicated a
command, noting that the officer asked the passengers for permission
to search the bags and their persons. 38 The officer asked if Drayton
and Brown objected before he searched them. 139 He provided Drayton
with no indication that he was required to consent to a search; rather,
he asked for permission to perform the search. 140 Based on these
facts, the Court held that the searches were voluntary.' 4 '
There has been some confusion over whether the factors
announced in Schneckloth and other consent cases are to be applied
subjectively or objectively. 142 In the case of a subjective standard, the
court would consider the suspect's beliefs or perspective. 43 Under the
130. Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 979 (1974). See KAMISAR, supra note 129, at 339
(discussing Gentile, 419 U.S. at 979.).
131. Gentile, 419 U.S. at 979-80.
132. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). See KAMISAR, supra note 129, at 340
(discussing Florida v. Jimeno and the "scope of a suspect's consent").
133. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002).
134. Id. at 199.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 206.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 207.
142. Strauss, supra note 2, at 229, 235.
143. Id. at 229.
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objective standard, a court would consider what a reasonable person
would believe or whether police acted reasonably in a given
situation. 144 Recent Supreme Court Fourth and Fifth Amendment
cases have shown a tendency to favor objective standards over
subjective standards. 145 For example, in Colorado v. Connelly the
Supreme Court ruled that actual police coercion was necessary for a
finding that a confession is not voluntary.1 46 The Eleventh and the
D.C. Circuits have rejected invitations to apply Connelly to
voluntariness in the context of consent searches,1 47 but the Fourth
Circuit cited Connelly in holding that the relevant question for the
consent voluntariness inquiry is whether there actually was
coercion.1 48 The Second Circuit has held that the test for determining
consent is an objective one.149 While these cases did not on their face
overrule the subjective voluntariness standard established in
Schneckloth, they have created some uncertainty and may explain
why the courts pay less attention than might be expected to subjective
factors in assessing voluntariness. 150
III. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPROACHES TO CONSENT
SEARCHES
This Part considers the approaches of different jurisdictions to
various types of consent search situations. The first section discusses
the approach of the State of Washington's courts to home consent
searches, focusing in depth on the seminal case discussing the new
approach to home consent searches taken by that state. 151 It then
describes the ensuing case law in Washington. The second section
analyzes the approaches that other states have taken to consent
searches. The third section focuses on recent judicial and
administrative treatment of requests for consent following traffic stops
and the additional problems that they may create.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); Strauss, supra note 2, at 232. In
Connelly, a man approached a police officer and confessed to a murder, and repeated the
confession several times despite Miranda warnings. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 160. A psychologist
testified that the defendant suffered from schizophrenia and command hallucinations that made
him unable to make a free and rational choice. Id. at 160-61.
147. United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1108 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Tukes v. Dugger 911
F.2d 508, 516-17 n.13 (11th Cir. 1990); Strauss, supra note 2, at 234.
148. United States v. Quezada, No. 91-500, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22712, at *2 (4th Cir.
Sept. 30, 1991); Strauss, supra note 2, at 234.
149.United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1995); Strauss, supra note 2, at 233.
150. Strauss, supra note 2, at 232-33, 235.
151. State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998).
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A. Knock and Talk: State v. Ferrier
In State v. Ferrier, police obtained information from Ferrier's
son that his mother was growing marijuana at her house. 15 2 However,
his credibility was not ascertainable since he had no record as an
informant. 153 The police drove by the house and confirmed that the
house matched the description they were given. 154 Four police officers
went to Ferrier's residence. 155 They were all armed and each wore a
black "raid jacket" with the word "police" in yellow letters on the front
and back. 156 Two of the officers proceeded to the back of the house to
"secure the premises," and the other two proceeded to the front
entrance.157
The officers testified that Ferrier opened the door after they
knocked.'58  They testified that they immediately identified
themselves as police officers and she then invited them into her
home. 59 The officers in the house then radioed the officers in back,
and they entered the home as well. 60 The officers told Ferrier that
they had information that she was growing marijuana and they
requested permission to search.' 6 ' The officers indicated that they
went over a "consent to search" form with Ferrier before she signed. 62
The form did not inform her that she had the right to refuse
consent. 63 The officers did not inform Ferrier of her right to refuse
consent or any other right.164 Ferrier eventually led the officers to a
locked room, which she opened for them to search. 16 5 Officers testified
that Ferrier was crying during the time the officers were searching the
room and that she appeared frightened and nervous the entire time
they were on the premises. 66
152. Id. at 928.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 928-29.
159. Id. at 929.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Ferrier testified that the officers stepped into the house while
they said that they wanted to talk to her about her son.167 She stated
that she was scared and that the police told her that they were going
to take her grandchildren to Protective Services. 168 She testified that
she only signed the consent to search form because she did not want
them to take her grandchildren away. 169
The search resulted in the seizure of marijuana plants and
other evidence of marijuana cultivation. 170 Ferrier was charged with
manufacturing a controlled substance. 171 Ferrier moved to suppress
all of the evidence found in her home, and the trial court denied the
motion. 172 Ferrier and the state stipulated as to the facts and the trial
court found her guilty of the charged crime. 173 Ferrier appealed the
conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court
judgment. 174 The Washington Supreme Court then granted Ferrier's
petition for review. 175
The Washington Supreme Court first rejected Ferrier's claim
that the knock and talk procedure violated her rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 76  The
majority noted that failure to warn had been merely a factor and was
not necessarily dispositive in assessing the voluntariness of her
consent.177 It then considered the claim under Article I, Section 7 of
the Washington State Constitution. 178 The court applied the six
nonexclusive criteria identified in State v. Gunwall 79 to determine
whether Article I, Section 7 goes further than the Fourth Amendment
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (referencing State v. Ferrier, No. 19280-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1996)).
175. State v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927, 929 (Wash. 1998).
176. Id. at 929-30.
177. Id. at 930. For this proposition, the court cited State v. Shoemaker, 533 P.2d 123
(Wash. 1975) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v.
Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1974)). The Court also noted, however, that it was not obliged
to consider the question since Ferrier had cited no authority for her contention, and it would be
improper to apply the federal Constitution before the Washington Constitution. Ferrier, 960
P.2d at 930 & n.4.
178. Id.; see WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law."). The Court noted that "unlike the Fourth
Amendment, Const. art. 1, § 7 'clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy with no express
limitations."' Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 930 (citations omitted) (emphasis added by Ferrier court).
179. State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 811 (Wash. 1986).
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in protecting Ferrier's privacy interests.180  Since the court was
analyzing the same provision that was at issue in Gunwall, it adopted
the analysis of factors one, two, three, and five from that case.181
Concerning the fourth factor-preexisting state law-the
majority found many state cases indicating that Washington had
historically afforded individuals an increased level of privacy in
similar situations.18 2 These included cases prohibiting warrantless
infrared surveillance of a home,18 3 warrantless search of curbside
trash,18 4 warrantless obtaining of phone records or installation of a
pen register;185 and finding an Article ., Section 7 violation in a
warrantless intrusion into a student's dormitory room.18 6 The court
found that preexisting state law supported independent review of the
case under Article I, Section 7.187
The court noted that for the analysis of the sixth Gunwall
factor-whether the privacy interest at issue is a matter of particular
state or local concern-privacy in the home is a matter of local concern
and that there is no need for national uniformity on the issue.188
Rejecting one of the State's contentions, the majority stated that "[t]he
core of [Ferrier's] argument is that the police here violated her
180. Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 930. The six factors are (1) the state constitution's textual
language; (2) significant textual differences between parallel state and federal constitutional
provisions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5)
structural differences between the state and federal constitutions; and (6) whether the privacy
interest at issue is a matter of particular state or local concern. Id. at 930-31 & n.5; see also
Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811 (stating the same six factors).
181. Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 930.
182. Id. at 930-31.
183. Young, 867 P.2d at 593. But see United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001)
("Where... the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a
private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a Fourth Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.").
184. State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1112-15 (Wash. 1990). But see California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) ("The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and
seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home.").
185. Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 808 (Wash. 1986). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735
(1979) ("The installation and use of the pen register was not a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and hence no warrant was required.").
186. State v. Chrisman, 676 P.2d 419 (1984). The Washington State Court's opinion in State
v. Chrisman, 619 P.2d 971 ( Wash. 1980), which found a violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, was reversed and remanded by the United States Supreme Court in
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982). Chrisman, 676 P.2d at 421. On remand, the
Washington Supreme Court reached the same result as in the first case, based on article I,
section 7. Id.
187. Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 931.
188. Id.
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expectation of privacy in her home because they conducted the knock
and talk in order to search her home . ... "189
Having satisfied the need for an independent analysis, the
court then considered whether the knock and talk violated Article I,
Section 7.190 The court found it important that Ferrier was in her
home when the police initiated contact and that the police used the
procedure to avoid the necessity of obtaining a warrant. 191 However,
the most important factor was that the police did not advise Ferrier
that she had the right to refuse consent. 192 Based on these facts, the
majority found that the knock and talk violated Ferrier's state
constitutional right to privacy in her home since she was not advised
that she could refuse consent.193
The court then stated that central to its holding was the belief
that any knock and talk is coercive to some degree. 194 It noted that
the great majority of home dwellers would not question the absence of
a search warrant. 195 Therefore, the majority agreed that Ferrier's
testimony that she was afraid and nervous seemed reasonable, and
that it was not surprising that an officer testified that virtually
everyone confronted by a knock and talk agrees to the search.196
The majority then stated that the coercive effects of the knock
and talk procedure could be mitigated by requiring officers to warn
homeowners of their right to refuse consent to a warrantless search.197
The court stated that because citizens of Washington are entitled to
the expectation of privacy in the home due to its heightened
constitutional protection, public policy supports a rule governing
knock and talk searches. 198 The court stated:
189. Id. at 932.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 932-33.
194. Id. at 933.
195. Id. The Court believed that the majority of citizens "would not question the absence of a
search warrant because they either (1) would not know that a warrant is required; (2) would feel
inhibited from requesting its production, even if they knew of the warrant requirement; or (3)
would simply be too stunned by the circumstances to make a reasoned decision about whether or
not to consent to a warrantless search." Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. The Court also stated that its decision was consistent with that of the New Jersey
Supreme Court, which held under article I, section 7 of its state constitution that "where the
State seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of showing that the
consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent."
Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975)).
198. Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 934.
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We, therefore, adopt the following rule: that when police officers conduct a knock and
talk for the purpose of obtaining consent to search a home, and thereby avoid the
necessity of obtaining a warrant, they must, prior to entering the home, inform the
person from whom consent is sought that he or she may lawfully refuse to consent to the
search and that they can revoke, at any time, the consent that they give, and can limit
the scope of the consent to certain areas of the home. The failure to provide these
warnings, prior to entering the home, vitiates any consent given thereafter. 
19 9
The court noted that it was simply stating the obvious-that
the only way to give the protection substance is to require a warning
of its existence. 200
Faced with several opportunities to expand the Ferrier
doctrine, the Washington courts have limited the rule to the situation
of a request to search the home. 201  In State v. Williams, the
Washington Supreme Court held that warnings were not required
when authorities sought entry to arrest an occupant pursuant to an
arrest warrant. 20 2 Likewise, in State v. Bustamante-Davila it held that
the warnings were not required when an INS agent entered a home to
serve a deportation order.203 Finally, in State v. Khounvichai, the
court found it unnecessary for the police to give warnings when they
request entry into a home to question or gain information from an
occupant. 204
B. Approaches of Other States' Courts
Several other states have consent search doctrines with
heightened standards for providing knowledge of the right to refuse.
As noted by the Ferrier court, New Jersey, based on its own
constitutional provision, 20 5 makes knowledge of the right to refuse
consent an essential element of the voluntariness inquiry.20 6 Based on
199. Id.
200. Id. at 933.
201. State v. Khounvichai, 69 P.3d 862, 867 (Wash. 2003) ("As this Court stated in Williams,
'[w]e do not find it prudent or necessary to extend Ferrier to require that police advise citizens of
their right to refuse entry every time a police officer enters their home.' ") (quoting State v.
Williams, 11 P.3d 714, 720 (Wash. 2000)).
202. State v. Williams, 11 P.3d 714, 720 (Wash. 2000).
203. Id. at 865; Williams, 11 P.3d at 720; State v. Bustamante-Davila, 983 P.2d 590, 599
(Wash. 1999).
204. Khounvichai, 69 P.3d at 867.
205. The New Jersey Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be
seized.
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 7.
206. Ferrier, 960 P.2d at 933 (citing State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975)).
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its state constitution,207 Mississippi requires knowledgeable waiver
before consent to a search. 208 Prior to consent, "it must clearly appear
that [an individual] voluntarily permitted, or expressly invited and
agreed to the search, being cognizant of her rights in the premises
when the officer proposed to her, by asking her permission, to make
the search without a warrant."20 9 The Hawaii Supreme Court held in
State v. Trainor210 that whether a person consented to an encounter
for the purposes of satisfying article I, section 7 of the Hawaii
Constitution 21  "involve[s] a determination as to (1) whether the
person was timely advised that he or she had the right to decline to
participate in the encounter and could leave at any time, and (2)
whether, thereafter, the person voluntarily participated in the
encounter."212  One state has disagreed with Ferrier and one has
expressly declined to follow it.213
A greater number of states have provided protections for
motorists who have been stopped and asked for consent to search their
vehicles. The United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the
traffic stop situation in Ohio v. Robinette.21 4 In that case, the Ohio
Supreme Court ruled that police officers must inform motorists that
their legal detention had concluded before engaging in consensual
interrogation.21 5 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision,
stating that it would "be unrealistic to require police officers to always
inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search
may be deemed voluntary." 216
207. "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from
unreasonable seizure or search; and no warrant shall be issued without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and the person
or thing to be seized." MISS. CONST. art. III, para. 23.
208. Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 549 (Miss. 1983).
209. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 98 So. 344, 345 (Miss. 1923) (emphasis added), cited in
Graves v. Mississippi, 708 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss. 1997)).
210. 925 P.2d 818, 823 (Hawaii 1996).
211. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or the communications
sought to be intercepted." HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7.
212. Trainor, 925 P.2d at 823.
213. See Hadl v. State, 47 S.W.3d 897, 900 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (disagreeing with Ferrier);
Scott v. State, 782 A.2d 862, 876 (Md. Ct. App. 2001) (expressly declining to follow Ferrier and
Johnson).
214. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
215. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 697 (Ohio 1995).
216. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
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In State v. George,217 the Minnesota Supreme Court, based on
Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, 218 mandated more
careful review of the practice of using traffic stops to request consent
to search the vehicle. 219 One commentator correctly notes several
reasons for the Court's heightened scrutiny of these traffic stops.22 0
First, the technique can be used against virtually any vehicle operator
as "very few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without
violating some traffic regulation."221 Second, police can use the
technique solely as a pretext for seeking drugs or weapons, even when
there is no reasonable suspicion of possession of such items and when
the traffic stop otherwise would not have occurred. 222 Third, the wide
discretion given to police means that they can "target members of
groups identified by factors that are totally impermissible as a basis
for law enforcement activity."223 Fourth, because of the traffic stop,
the driver from whom consent is sought may be "unaware that he had
a right to refuse consent to the search or to leave."224 Finally, as a
result of extensive police training on this technique, there is an
"increasing use by state troopers and police officers of subtle tactics to
get motorists and others to 'consent.' 225
In State v. Fort, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
request for consent to search which had no reasonable relation to the
stop and was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion was
"beyond the scope of the traffic stop."226  Since an expansion of the
duration or scope of a traffic stop without reasonable articulable
suspicion is not permitted in Minnesota, the Court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress. 227
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Carty upheld a
lower court decision which required reasonable and articulable
217. 557 N.W.2d 575 (Minn. 1997).
218. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized." MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
219. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 8.2(b), at 636.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 416, 419 (Minn. 2003) ("We ... conclude that the
investigative questioning, consent inquiry, and subsequent search went beyond the scope of the
traffic stop and was unsupported by any reasonable articulable suspicion.").
227. Id. at 419.
20051 1301
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
suspicion as a prerequisite for requesting consent to search. 228 The
court held that "unless there is a reasonable and articulable basis
beyond the initial valid motor vehicle stop to continue the detention
after completion of the valid traffic stop, any further detention to
effectuate a consent search is unconstitutional. 229  The majority
stated that its holding was inconsistent with the State Police
Standard Operating Procedures and a consent decree entered into by
the state police in 1999.230
C. Law Enforcement Responses to Charges of Discrimination: Consent
Searches Following Traffic Stops
Law enforcement authorities have taken steps to limit consent
searches following traffic stops in order to discourage racial
profiling. 231 Beginning in the summer of 2001, in addition to requiring
state trooper to have a reasonable articulable suspicion that a search
is warranted, New Jersey began requiring them to obtain their
supervisor's approval before conducting a consent search. 232  In
January 2003, the Maryland State Police reached a partial settlement
in a racial profiling lawsuit, which, in part, required state troopers to
inform drivers that they have a right to refuse and to have them waive
that right in writing.233 In fact, many troopers had already warned
motorists before asking for consent and had them waive the right in
writing. 234 In April 2001, the California Highway Patrol commissioner
ordered a six-month moratorium on consent searches. 235 In February
2003, in the settlement of a class-action suit alleging racial profiling,
the California Highway Patrol "became the nation's first law
228. State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 2002).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. In addition to those mentioned here, it is likely that more will follow. In June 2001, at
least eight agencies were collecting data on racial profiling by order of a federal court or under
agreement with the U.S. Justice Department. Lori Montgomery, New Police Policies Aim to
Discourage Racial Profiling, WASH. POST, June 28, 2001, at A01. Further, 400 of the nation's
18,000 police agencies were collecting data. Id.
232. David Kocieniewski, Officials Say Figures Show that Profiling is Decreasing, N.Y.
TIMES, March 9, 2002, at B5.
233. Jo Becker, Maryland State Police Reach Deal on Profiling, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at
A01. The agreement also required the state police to make use of information they collect about
stops, investigate them further and take appropriate action. Id. State troopers must also make
copies of a brochure on how to file racial profiling complaints available to drivers. Id.
234. Id.
235. Assoc. Press, CHP Director Suspends 'Consent' Car Searches Patrols, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2001, § 1, at A23.
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enforcement agency to voluntarily agree to stop asking motorists for
permission to search their vehicles. 236
IV. CONSENT SEARCHES: THEORY, APPLICATION, AND OBEDIENCE
This Part will consider the various aspects of the consent
search. The first section will analyze the doctrinal basis of consent
searches and examine the concept of voluntariness as the standard
used to determine of whether consent was voluntarily given. The
second section will present problems that have been identified in
judicial application of the totality of the circumstances test to the facts
of particular cases. The final section will suggest possible problems
with the idea of voluntariness of consent.
A. Basis and Theory of Consent Searches
The Supreme Court has suggested several justifications for the
consent search exception to the general warrant requirement. The
Court stated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, "[A] search pursuant to
consent may result in considerably less inconvenience for the subject
of the search, and, properly conducted, is a constitutionally
permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity."237
However, this goes no further to justify consent searches as an
independent technique than it does any other effective law
enforcement tool.
Another possible basis for the consent search is respect for the
autonomy of the individual. 238 The decision to consent is that of the
individual and should be given effect.239 One commentator notes that
consent searches are privately authorized, 240 which suggests that in
the context of consent searches there is greater concern for the
autonomy of the individual. This argument is supported by insights
gleaned from libertarian tort theory, which suggests that a person
exercises absolute dominion over himself and that an actor "owns"
236. Maura Dolan & John M. Glionna, CHP Settles Lawsuit Over Claims of Racial Profiling,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, § 1, at Al. The CHP will be required to monitor its officers by
collecting data on every traffic stop, including the race of the motorist, whether a search was
conducted, and what was found. Id. The CHP, which denies it stops motorists because of their
ethnicity, will continue to search where it has probable cause to suspect a crime. Id.
237. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
238. Strauss, supra note 2, at 268.
239. See id. (making, and ultimately rejecting, the autonomy argument).
240. See Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 175 n.4 ("The private consent of some private person
makes each individual consent search valid. Without this authorization, it is nothing.").
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both his "goods" and his "bads.' '24' A similar theory emphasizing
individual will is applied in contract law.2 42 In the case of the consent
search, authorities recognize the dominion that the individual
exercises over herself and respect both her good decisions and bad
decisions. 243 Thus, even an ill-advised or foolish decision would have
to be honored, in order to fully respect the individual.244
This individual autonomy basis may also explain third-party
consent searches as well.245 The third-party search might be seen as
validation of a previous, implicit consent through the knowledge that
the other owners have access to the property. 246  However, the
foregoing rationale does not explain apparent authority consent
searches. 247 The fact that the police acted reasonably in believing that
the subject of the search granted them consent does not relate to the
autonomy of the individual and his private decision to consent to the
search. Rather, this standard considers the reasonableness of the
police actions, implicating the possible rationale for voluntariness of
constraining police activity to prevent misconduct.248
One may also question the basis for the voluntariness
standard. The Court in Schneckloth discarded the knowing and
241. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 555-56
(2003). ("The premise of the theory is that a person exercises absolute dominion over himself-
his body and his reputation .... The downside is that the actor owns his 'bads' as exclusively as
he owns his goods.").
242. See Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law,
35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 790 (2002) ("According to [libertarian] theory, respecting individual
will is an end in itself').
243. This may go toward explaining the part of the voluntariness analysis in State v. Ferrier.
It seems somewhat incongruous to think of the crying Ferrier as being respected as an
autonomous being fully in control of her actions. See note 166 and accompanying text. However,
this may simply be one of the bads that are owned by the individual. To not respect this decision
may be seen as equally intrusive of her autonomy as to not respect one about which she is more
confident.
244. See Scott v. State, 782 A.2d 862, 875 (Md. 2001) ("In hindsight, [defendant's consent to
the search] was a foolish decision, from his point of view, but the issue is not whether the consent
was an intelligent one, only whether it was voluntary.").
245. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974) ("The consent of one who
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent,
nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared").
246. See id. at 171 n.7:
Common authority ... rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the
common area to be searched.
247. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 188-89 (1990) (holding that a consent
search may be upheld on the basis that the officers had a reasonable belief that the person from
whom they obtained consent has authority over the premises).
248. See infra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
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intelligent waiver standard in favor of the voluntariness standard on
the basis that the waiver protects trial rights, which serve a different
purpose than the Fourth Amendment rights.249  The Sixth
Amendment trial rights are intended to preserve a fair trial.250 The
Court has suggested that the voluntariness standard is the result of
balancing the need for consent searches and assuring absence of
coercion.2 51  However, while the test's factors consider the police
actions in the specific case, there is no consideration of the specific
need for the search in that case.25 2 But since the results of the search
are well-known at the time of the suppression hearing, it is likely that
they will be a factor in the decision. This is true even though the
results of a search are not explicitly a factor that courts use to
determine voluntariness. Further, there is reason to question how
society's need for searches relates to voluntariness.2 53
There is some language in the Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
opinion suggesting that the basis for the voluntariness standard is the
prevention of police misconduct as the standard disallows coercion. 25 4
This coercion would most likely be caused by police officers, suggesting
that the courts might utilize the voluntariness standard to avoid
police misconduct. Prevention of police misconduct would ensure to
some degree that the consent decision is the product of the person's
free will. This seems to be a likely basis for the apparent authority
249. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241-43 (1973). The knowing and intelligent
waiver standard was enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
250. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236.
251. Id. at 227. ("As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated
in determining the meaning of a 'voluntary' consent-the legitimate need for such searches and
the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion.").
252. Instead, there is often a general statement of the need for and utility of consent
searches, and consideration of the ramifications on effective police work of changing consent law.
See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 ("In situations where the police have some evidence of
illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent
may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence."). The Schneckloth Court
stated that if the prosecution were required to prove that the subject of the search knew that he
had a right to refuse consent, it "would, in practice, create serious doubt whether consent
searches could continue to be conducted," except in "rare cases where it could be proved from the
record that a person in fact affirmatively knew of his right to refuse." Id. at 229-30.
253. One commentator has criticized considering law enforcement interests in the
voluntariness inquiry. Society's need for searches "arguably has nothing to do with the
voluntariness of consent." Strauss, supra note 2, at 258 n.171 (quoting ALAN WERTHEIMER,
COERCION 117 (1987)).
254. "Similar considerations lead us to agree with the courts of California that the question
whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion,
express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added). "The problem of reconciling the
recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect
of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone." Id. at 229. (emphasis added).
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cases, since if the officers behave reasonably, the search will be
valid.255 If the officers did nothing wrong in their determination of
who had authority to consent, the search should be upheld.
B. Problems in the Application of the Law
One commentator has criticized judges' analysis of factual
scenarios presented in consent search cases.256 She found that out of
hundreds of cases, only a handful analyzed the suspect's particular
subjective factors.257 Of these, only a few judges found the suspect's
particular subjective factors to be compelling. 258 In most cases where
consent was found to be involuntary, the court instead focused on
egregious police misconduct. 259 One commentator has argued that in
practice, "courts find consent to be voluntary in all but the most
extreme circumstances." 260 In general, four types of police misconduct
lead to a finding of involuntary consent: (1) threats to the suspect or
the suspect's family, (2) deprivation of necessities until consent, (3)
asserting an absolute right to search, and (4) an unusual and extreme
show of force. 26 1
The Court has also been faced with practical arguments
suggesting that the voluntariness standard does not comport with how
one would expect a person possessing contraband or evidence of a
crime to behave. The Supreme Court has considered why a person
would voluntarily consent to a search when it is so likely that
contraband would be found. 262 It noted that the reasonable person in
the reasonable person test is an innocent person.263 However, in other
255. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S., 177, 185-86, 188-89 (1990) ("[W]hat is generally
demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the
government-whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a warrant,
or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement-is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable").
256. Strauss, supra note 2, at 221-35.
257. Id. at 222.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 225.
260. Strauss, supra note 2, at 223 (citing DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS
IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32 (1999)).
261. Strauss, supra note 2, at 225.
262. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1991) ("We do reject, however, Bostick's
argument that he must have been seized because no reasonable person would freely consent to a
search of luggage that he or she knows contains drugs. This argument cannot prevail because the
"reasonable person" test presupposes an innocent person.").
263. Id.
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areas of criminal law, the law distinguishes the innocent person from
the reasonable person. 264
One possible problem with the application of consent doctrine
to consent searches is the confusion over whether the voluntariness
standard is subjective or objective. 265 Recent Supreme Court cases
have emphasized objective standards under certain areas of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, focusing either on what a reasonable
person would believe or whether police acted reasonably under the
circumstances. 266 The confusion over the proper standard has led to
imprecision in court rulings on voluntariness in consent searches.
267
C. Obedience Theory
Even if the doctrine of consent searches is sound and the law is
rigorously applied to the facts of the case, the use of psychological
research in conjunction with the concept of voluntariness calls into
question the validity of the concept as applied in the consent search
scenario. 268  Commentators have suggested the applicability of a
famous psychological study by Stanley Milgram. 269
In 1960, Milgram recruited a number of individuals to
participate in an experiment that they were told was intended to
study the effects of punishment on learning. 270 One of the individuals
was the confederate of the experimenter, and he became the "learner"
264. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (2003). The risk that a reckless actor disregards
must be one that is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor's situation. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). The risk of which a negligent actor should have
been aware must be one that his failure to perceive it involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
265. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 227, 229, 232-33 ("[Slome lingering questions [exist] as to
which perspective-subjective or objective-should be utilized .....
266. Id. at 229.
267. See id. at 235 (The lack of clear standard has 'led to confusion at best and inadequate
protection for suspects' Fourth Amendment rights at worst.").
268. See Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 233 (1997) ('The most baffling aspect of the Supreme Court's conception of voluntary
consent is that it virtually ignores the well-documented observation that most people
mechanically obey legitimate authority.").
269. E.g., id. at 233. This assertion was first made by Professor Rotenberg. See Rotenberg,
supra note 3, at 188-89 (discussing research showing a natural tendency to consent to authority
figures). Barrio notes that "[olne of the purposes of this note is to expand upon professor
Rotenberg's novel argument by offering the Milgram experiments not only as evidence that
consent searches raise a significant risk of psychological coercion, but also as concrete proof for
the proposition that consent searches require prophylactic Fourth Amendment warnings."
Barrio, supra note 268, at 216 n.2.
270. Id. at 233-34.
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in the experiment, while the other individual was the "teacher."271
The teacher was to administer electric shocks of increasing intensity
when the learner failed to answer a question correctly.272 The teacher
was given a mild shock to increase the credibility of the experiment. 273
A fake shock generator had switches with messages marked from
"Slight Shock," "Moderate Shock," "Strong Shock," 'Very Strong
Shock," "Intense Shock," "Extremely Intense Shock," and "Danger:
Severe Shock," and at the far right of the panel two switches marked
,,XX.,,274
A prerecorded tape of the learner's feigned discomfort
increased from a grunt at seventy-five volts to agonized screams at
270 volts, to refusal to continue the experiment at 300, and beyond
that, silence. 275 The teacher was instructed to treat silence as an
incorrect answer.276 The experimenter had four statements to use if
the teacher vacillated: "Please continue," "The experiment requires
that you continue," "It is absolutely essential that you continue," and
"You have no choice but to continue." 277 The discomfort of the learner
led the teacher to want to stop administering the shocks, but the
experimenter, a legitimate authority figure, used the statements to
pressure the teacher to continue punishing the learner.278 The aim of
the experiment was "to measure the point at which the teacher's
moral resolve exceeded the pressure of obedience." 279
Milgram found a surprising level of obedience. 65 percent of
the teachers reached the maximum level of voltage: the switch marked
"XXX." 280 Subjects obeyed even when they heard that the learner had
a heart condition. 281 However, when the teacher and learner were in
the same room, the percentage who reached the maximum was only
forty, and when the learner was required to have tactile contact, the
obedience rate dropped to 30 percent. 282 Prior to the experiment,
psychiatrists and lay persons predicted that only 1 or 2 percent would
271. Id. at 234.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 235.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 236.
281. Strauss, supra note 2, at 237.
282. Id.
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shock the learner to the maximum level. 2 3 Milgram believed that the
learners were exhibiting the phenomenon of obedience to authority.28 4
He theorized that three factors accounted for the high level of
obedience observed. 28 5 First, social forces "prepare" individuals for
obedience because obeying authority is emphasized to children by
parents and teachers. 28 6 Second, the subjects came to view themselves
as "the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes," and this
undermined their resolve to challenge the experimenter's authority
since they no longer saw themselves as responsible for their actions.28 7
Finally, Milgram argued that situational determinants locked the
subjects into a pattern of obedience. 288 These determinants included
politeness, a desire to uphold the initial promise to the experimenter,
the awkwardness of refusing to complete the experiment, anxiety, and
the sequential nature of the task.289
Commentators have also analyzed another study supporting
Milgram's view that authority is contextual in nature.290 In 1974,
Leonard Bickman conducted an experiment proving that the degree of
obedience an authority figure receives depends in large part on the
uniform that the person wears. 291  Bickman arranged for three
experimenters in three different uniforms to accost random
pedestrians on the street. 292 The experimenters commanded that the
pedestrian perform a certain standardized task, from picking up a bag
to giving a stranger money for parking. 293 The three uniforms were
that of a civilian (consisting of a sports jacket and tie), a milkman in
uniform, and a uniformed guard.294 Bickman found that the guard
received the highest levels of obedience, with 75 percent of subjects
obeying, compared with 47 percent for the milkman and 29 for the
civilian. 295
Commentators have maintained that the results of these
experiments suggest a powerful ability of uniformed authority figures
283. Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 188 n.61 (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO
AUTHORITY 31 (1974)).
284. Barrio, supra note 268, at 236.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 237.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 238.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 239.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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to cause acquiescence in citizens. 296 Several observers have attributed
the coercive nature of consent searches to this concept and,
accordingly, have proposed solutions.297  One proponent of the
application of the foregoing studies to consent searches has argued
that citizens will view requests to search as commands.298 This
commentator offers several solutions based on this experimental
evidence-including informing subjects before requesting consent that
they have the right to refuse-and ultimately advocates the
elimination of consent searches. 299  The results of these studies
undercut the Court's perception of the voluntariness of consent when
asked by uniformed authority figures. 300
V. THE ARGUMENT FOR PRIVACY AS A CONSIDERATION IN CONSENT
SEARCHES
This Part will present the argument for including the level of
privacy objectively expected by the individual as a factor in the
totality of the circumstances. The first section will lay out a hierarchy
of protection under various Fourth Amendment contexts and will
present the underpinnings of the argument for consideration of
location in the consent search case. The second section will address
the benefits of including privacy as a factor in the determination of
whether a search was consensual. The third section will consider the
inclusion of an element of privacy compared to the alternative of
providing a prophylactic warning.
296. See id. at 240 ("[T]he guard's uniform conveyed the sense that its wearer was someone
who had a responsible job and could be trusted."); Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 193 ("Both law and
psychology point to the same conclusion--consent in reality is consentless."); Strauss, supra note
2, at 288-89 ("[T]his seems to be one small step removed from recognizing that... police officers
in uniform convey... authority and power .... ).
297. See Barrio, supra note 268, at 233-244 (arguing for a Fourth Amendment warning
requirement); Craig M. Bradley, The Court's Curious Consent Search Doctrine, 38 TRIAL 72
(October 2002) (arguing for an advisory requirement); Herbert Gaylord, Case Note, What Good is
the Fourth Amendment? "Knock and Talk" & People v. Frohriep, 19 COOLEY L. REV. 229, 229-234
(2002) (analyzing "knock and talk" caselaw); David M. McGlaughlin, Consent to Search and
Knowledge of the Right to Refuse, 23 PA. LAW. 43, 43 (2001) (arguing suspect should be informed
of his right to refuse consent); Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 175-177 (advocating for a series of
controls to restrain consent doctrine); Strauss, supra note 2, at 237-240 (arguing consent should
be universally rejected); Robert H. Whorf, "Coercive Ambiguity" in the Routine Traffic Stop
Turned Consent Search, 30 SUFFOLK L. REV. 379, 379 (1997) (arguing police should be required
to tell a motorist he is "free to go" before requesting consent).
298. Strauss, supra note 2, at 240-42.
299. Id. at 252-56, 258-72.
300. See Barrio, supra note 268, at 218, 240 ("[O]bedience theory casts serious doubt on the
continued vitality of what Schneckloth characterized as Miranda's central holding: that custody
is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of psychological coercion.").
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A. A Hierarchy of Privacy Protections
Fourth Amendment case law has created a hierarchy of privacy
protections, which depend greatly on one's location at the time of the
search or seizure. Some of these apply a higher standard to the
showing of reasonableness, while others operate as categorical rules
preventing the operation of a search or seizure that intrudes into a
specified area. This section examines language explaining this
hierarchy and provides an overview of the contours of the hierarchy.
1. Treatment of the Home in Search Cases
The home is still accorded significant deference in search cases,
even if not as much deference as is granted to the privacy of the home
in other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Further, Kyllo
may signal an increase in the level of privacy that the courts will
approve of for an individual in the search context. Even before Kyllo,
the Court emphasized the importance of privacy in the home. Justice
Harlan's concurrence in Katz, which came to be the majority position
on the issue,30 1 revealed that the Fourth Amendment did protect
people in some places more than others. In fact, Justice Harlan read
the Court's opinion as retaining some of the previous concepts from
the property-based conception of searches. He interpreted the opinion
to hold that "an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a
home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy."30 2  He noted that deciding what
protection the Fourth Amendment affords to people generally requires
reference to a place.3 0 3  Therefore, Katz reveals a heightened
consideration of privacy in the home even in the majority opinion. 30 4
One commentator has asserted that the Court never actually
abandoned the trespass test.30 5 He states that Harlan's concurrence
implies that consideration of the method of the search as a factor-not
301. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) ("The Katz test [is] whether the
individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable .. "); Short, supra note 34, at 467 ("The two-part test proposed by Justice Harlan in
his concurring opinion in Katz eventually came to be recognized as the new measuring stick for
the legitimacy of government searches.").
302. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (internal citations omitted).
303. Id. at 361 ("As the Court's opinion states, 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.' The question, however, is what protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here
the answer to that question requires reference to a 'place."').
304. See id. at 351 ("In support of their respective claims, the parties have compiled
competing lists of 'protected areas' for our consideration. It appears to be common ground that a
private home is such an area.").
305. Simmons, supra note 35, at 1314.
2005] 1311
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a "place-based analysis"-was the true evil that Katz set out to
dispel.30 6  While the Katz majority emphasized that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"30 7 the sanctity of the home
survived the apparent rejection of the physical invasion test.
Cases following Katz and preceding Kyllo reiterated the Court's
elevated concern for the home.3 08 In Oliver v. United States,3 9 the
Court juxtaposed the home with an area which received a lesser
privacy interest. It used the comparison of the curtilage and the home
to open fields to demonstrate that the open fields doctrine was
consistent with a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.310 The
Court stated that the curtilage was treated similarly to the home
because of the "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life."' 311  Courts have defined
curtilage "by reference to the factors that determine whether an
individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent
to the home will remain private."312 The curtilage therefore receives
more protection than open fields but less than the home itself.313
Oliver demonstrates an analytical structure that grants special status
to the home, as part of the hierarchy of locations that merit varying
degrees of protection from government intrusion.
Kyllo reiterated the Court's determination to accord special
importance to the home in search and seizure jurisprudence. The
decision focused upon the fact that the technology at issue had been
focused upon the home. 314 The Court stated, "In the home, our cases
306. Id. "Many courts properly reject the idea that Katz supplanted a 'place-based analysis,'
since the location of the search and the defendant' relationship to that location are still a
significant factor in determining whether or not the search was valid." Id. To support this point,
the author cites Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) ("[By] focusing on legitimate
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether
abandoned the use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy
interests protected by that Amendment."). Id. at 1314 n.43.
307. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
308. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 ("At the risk of belaboring the
obvious, private residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that
society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.").
309. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
310. Id. at 180.
311. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
312. Id.
313. See id. ("[T]he home will remain private... [c]onversely... no expectation of privacy
legitimately attaches to open fields.").
314. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 37-40 (2001) (citing Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) for the proposition that '[a]t the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion."').
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show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held
safe from prying government eyes. '315 The Kyllo case seems to move
closer to older ideas of property-based protections of the right to
privacy. Whatever the implications the decision has on the future of
the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test, Kyllo demonstrates a
high level of solicitude for privacy in the home.
2. Treatment of the Home in Other Fourth Amendment Contexts
The home also receives special treatment in other areas of
Fourth Amendment law. For example, in Payton v. New York, the
Court held that the police could not enter the home to arrest a suspect
without either an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances. 31 6  The
Court first stated, "[T]he Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the
entrance to the house."317 The Court then noted, "[in no setting] is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home."318  In
public places, however, there is no requirement that the police have a
warrant. 31 9 In the case of arrest with a warrant, there is a strong
basis for the entry into the home because of the determination of
probable cause by a "neutral and detached magistrate."320 The Court
has further protected the home in arrest and search cases by insisting
that the police knock and announce before entering the home to serve
the warrant.321 The protection of the home in home arrest cases seems
315. Id. at 37.
316. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 589. The Court also stated that the principles embodied in the Fourth
Amendment apply to all government invasions of "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life." Id. at 585.
319. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976). "The usual rule is that a police
officer may arrest without warrant one believed by the officer upon reasonable cause to have
been guilty of a felony .. " Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925)).
320. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or Government enforcement agent.").
321. Authorities may break open the doors of a dwelling, but generally must first announce
their presence and authority. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995). Whether they did so
is part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. Id. Warrant execution is also
addressed by federal statute:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part
of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself
or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2003).
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even stronger than in other Fourth Amendment areas, since there is a
categorical rule for arrests.
3. Automobile Stops and Searches and Open Fields
The Supreme Court has held there is a lower burden for the
search of an automobile than a home or office, since a citizen has a
significantly lower expectation of privacy in an automobile than in
one's home or office.322 The mobile nature of the vehicle makes it
readily movable and makes destruction of evidence easier.323 In the
case of open fields, the owner has been held to have no legitimate
expectation of privacy in that area. 324 As noted above, in Oliver v.
United States, the Court held that no legitimate expectation of privacy
attaches to open fields. 32 5 Open fields are not part of the cartilage of
the home and have not traditionally been treated as deserving as
much protection as, for example, the areas that are closer to the
home.326
B. The Proposal
This Note envisions an additional element in the test for
voluntariness of consent. This element would be weighed along with
the other factors relating to voluntariness that courts currently
employ to assess the validity of consent searches. 327 This element
would capture the different privacy interests that the Court has
delineated in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but which have not
been applied to consent searches.
Courts would apply the test enunciated in Katz v. United States
to determine the level of privacy expected by the subject of the
search.3 28 They would consider whether the person consenting to the
search had a subjective and an objective expectation of privacy in the
thing searched. 329 If a person is asked in the home to consent to a
search of another area on the property, for example, the relevant area
for the analysis would be the place the police wish to search, even
though consent was requested while the person was in the home. One
322. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
326. Id. at 180.
327. For an overview of factors courts currently employ, see supra notes 114-130 and
accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 18-39 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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possible alternative would be to have categorical rules for certain
areas, such as saying that a certain area always should be accorded a
certain level of privacy. 330 This alternative, however, has been used in
the context of other Fourth Amendment areas, such as arrests, while
searches have been governed by the Katz inquiry. One advantage of
the Katz test is that it is flexible enough to allow for determination of
a wide range of areas. Also, under the case law that has resulted from
Katz, courts will have adequate precedent to enable them to decide the
level of privacy in different areas. 331
The privacy analysis in the consent search context will be
easier to apply than that in the case of determining whether a search
has occurred. First, courts should not give so much consideration to
the type of technology used, or that could be used, since there will not
be advanced technology involved. Rather officers will simply be
asking for permission to search. One possibility for courts is to
consider what levels of technology might have detected what the
officers eventually found during the consent search. However, that
technique applies only in a case where the search has already taken
place and the court is aware that the search found the object to which
the defendant is asserting a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the
case of a consent search, it would be speculative and time-consuming
for courts to consider what technologies could possibly have detected
the object found by the search.332 Rather, courts should read the
330. Categorical rules delineating areas where privacy is expected have been used in other
areas of Fourth Amendment law, such as in the case of the general requirement of a warrant in
order to make an arrest in one's home. See supra notes 316-319 and accompanying text.
331. Katz is the standard for the legitimacy of government searches. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text. A Westlaw search on February 27, 2004, showed 11,705 documents referring
to the Katz decision. Scholarly commentary has considered a wide variety of areas where one
may or may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Daniel L. Collum, Comment,
Fourth Amendment and Maritime Drug Searches: Is There a "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy"
on Vessels at Sea?, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 367, 367-80 (discussing if crewman of vessels at sea
have a reasonable expectation of privacy); Alexandra Coulter, Special Project, Drug Couriers and
the Fourth Amendment: Vanishing Privacy Rights for Commercial Passengers, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1311, 1315-33 (1990) (discussing whether airline passengers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy); Sean M. Lewis, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Hallway: Do Tenants Have a
Constitutionally Protected Privacy Interest in the Locked Common Areas of their Apartment
Buildings?, 101 MICH. L. REV. 273, 273 (2002) (discussing whether apartment tenants have a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
332. There may be some cases in which the court will find that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy even in a place in which there is normally a high level of privacy
expectation. For example, if conspicuous contraband were in a readily observable place in the
home, such as prominently displayed in a window, then that fact might defeat an argument that
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item. However, courts should not attempt to
decide whether the object found might have been detected by some other method, ranging from a
heat sensor like that used in Kyllo to a flyover of the house from several hundred feet in the air
in an airplane or a helicopter. It is this latter consideration that would be difficult since in the
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precedent and focus on the place searched and the level of privacy
expectation accorded to that area.
Several examples illustrate how the privacy analysis would
function in different scenarios. First, consider the situation of a
citizen who is approached by the police, who knock on her door and
ask to search the shed in her backyard. She consents and the police
perform the search of the shed. At a suppression hearing in order to
determine the validity of consent, the court would first determine the
appropriate cases to consider. Even though consent was requested at
the home, the consent was requested for the shed, so that is the
relevant location. Therefore, the court would consider the cases on
privacy in structures such as a shed outside the curtilage.
Second, consider a factual situation similar to that in Florida v.
Riley: a search of a greenhouse for items which could be seen from the
air.333 The level of privacy expectation would depend on the location of
the greenhouse. There would be a higher level of privacy accorded to
the greenhouse if it were part of or attached to the home than if it
were outside the curtilage of the home. The court would analogize this
set of facts to the most similar cases it could find in the area. The
court would not consider, however, the fact that the items in the
greenhouse might have been seen by authorities in an airplane. Were
this the Riley case, the court would have had to deal with that issue.
In this case, though, the court would not speculatively consider all
possible methods of detection, but rather would focus on the protection
that case law accords to the area searched.
Once the proper analysis of the situation is made, the court
considers the expected level of privacy along with the other factors
used to assess the voluntariness of consent. The fact that a search is
of a location that has a low expectation of privacy will weigh in favor
of finding consent; a search of an area with a high level of privacy will
weigh in favor of finding no consent. The expected privacy level factor
would make the most difference in the result of the outlier cases
where there is ambiguity as to whether or not coercion occurred. In
cases where the other factors are split between valid consent and
invalid consent, a particularly strong or weak expectation of privacy is
likely to be much more determinative.
usual Katz case that specific method, be it heat sensor or flyover, has been used and the court
can focus on that method of search.
333. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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C. Reconciling Inconsistency in Fourth Amendment Caselaw
The privacy or location element in the totality of the
circumstances test would improve consistency with the other areas of
Fourth Amendment concern. The current test has no explicit
consideration of the area at which the consent search is directed,
except in the case where the person asked for consent is in custody
and to the extent that the location bears upon the issue of coercive
surroundings. However, in other areas of the Fourth Amendment, the
location of the activity sought to be protected is a primary concern.334
Recent events in some jurisdictions further modify the balance
between the privacy accorded the home and that accorded other areas.
For example, several jurisdictions, either through the courts or
through department policy, have limited or eliminated the use of
consent searches following traffic stops, and many others are
investigating their own procedures. 335 These decisions have gone
beyond the consent search status quo that puts the home and other
areas on the same plane in terms of protection of privacy. They have
created a situation where, with respect to the consent search, there is
considerably more privacy given to the automobile. This approach is
inconsistent with a central principle of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has stated, "[P]hysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed. . .."336
Most of the foregoing policies regarding consent searches were
adopted due to fears about racial discrimination, not privacy. 337
Racial profiling is a concern which may override other privacy rights
and extend beyond Fourth Amendment considerations.3 3 8 However,
334. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (discussing higher privacy
interest in the home); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (same); see also supra notes
308-319 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part III.C.
336. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972).
337. See supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
338. Namely, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Some scholars have argued for a conception of the Fourth
Amendment that would itself protect certain minority groups from discriminatory conduct. For
example, Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares base a theory of criminal procedure based on
the constitutional theory insights of John Hart Ely, whose representation-reinforcement theory
of the Constitution suggested that the judiciary stringently scrutinize disadvantaging "discrete
and insular minorities." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Luna, supra note 8,
at 808-09. Kahan and Meares utilize this theory to formulate a theory of criminal procedure
emphasizing that constitutional limitations are intended to prevent oppression of disempowered
groups, and suggesting that judges be especially wary of conduct that focuses on a despised
caste. Luna, supra note 8, at 809-10; Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of
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while the problem of profiling may be most obvious in the context of
consent searches following traffic stops, this problem is equally likely
to occur in other circumstances. For example, there is nothing to
prevent authorities from conducting home consent searches based on
racially discriminatory motives. In fact, a home consent search may
present an easier target for discriminatory targeting. In the traffic
stop case, there must at least be a valid reason for stopping the
vehicle. However, in the home consent search there is no such
limitation on the ability of the police to ask for permission to search.
Another consideration in the comparison of the consent search
to other areas of search and seizure law concerns exceptions to the
warrant requirement. This consideration focuses on what
characteristics the consent search shares and does not share with
other exceptions to the general warrant requirement, as opposed to
characteristics of other types of searches. Most of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement for searches and arrests require some sort of
justification. Some require an evidentiary justification, such as the
protective stop and frisk;33 9 while some are based on other concerns,
such as the exigent circumstances exception. 340 Those that require an
evidentiary justification-such as meeting the requirements of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion-demand that the police have
some amount of evidence that the person searched has committed a
Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1157 (1198). Under this theory, the Fourth Amendment
becomes a criminal procedure analog to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Luna, supra note 8, at 803-04.
The Supreme Court, however, has been careful to prevent the conflation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment in the context of criminal procedure.
We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
339. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him.
Id.
340. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) ("[A] warrantless intrusion may be justified
by hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or imminent destruction of evidence ... or the need to prevent a
suspect's escape, or the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the
dwelling.").
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violation of the law. Consent searches, however, require no level of
evidentiary burden to justify their use. 341
The exigent circumstances exception allows the police to enter
the home without a warrant if they are in hot pursuit of a felon, or if
they have probable cause to believe that there would be escape of a
suspect, imminent destruction of evidence, or a risk of danger to the
police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.34 2  This
exception requires an evidentiary showing as well, although it
requires more than just a belief that the person committed a crime or
that evidence will be in a certain place. Still, this exception seems to
be a more compelling justification for invading a homeowner's privacy,
since there may be a real risk of harm to the police or bystanders,
except in the case of imminent destruction of evidence. In the case of
a consent search, it may lead to the discovery of evidence of criminal
activity, enhancing crime fighting and law enforcement. 343 However,
the chance that the police action will have a large effect in a given
case seems less likely than in the case of exigent circumstances. 344
The exigent circumstances exception differs from the consent
search exception in another important way. If there are exigent
circumstances, then the police can enter the home in the same way
that they may enter if there is consent. In the arrest warrant
situation, however, exigent circumstances give the police a right that
they do not otherwise have under Payton. The consent search doctrine
does not give the police any rights that they do not already have, since
they have the same right to ask for consent on a public street, during a
traffic stop, or in the home. 345  In effect, unlike the exigent
circumstances exception, the consent search doctrine operates without
341. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (stating that the State must
show that the consent was voluntary to uphold the search; no mention is made of any other
requirement); Rotenberg, supra note 3, at 183. One commentator notes that the implicit
assumption that evidence will be found during a consent search "strangely... need not
correspond with the presence of probable cause or a warrant or any other basis for suspicion."
Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 149 (2002).
342. Olson, 495 U.S. at 100.
343. This is one of the arguments made to support consent searches. See Strauss, supra note
2, at 258-59.
344. In the case of exigent circumstances, the police must find one of the exigent
circumstances upon which to base the entry. This showing suggests a present risk to society.
The results of the consent search, which does not even require reasonable suspicion, seem
speculative at best, given the lower chance that a given search will result in contraband or other
evidence based upon which to arrest and charge a defendant. See supra note 341 and
accompanying text.
345. This statement excludes the states that have decided otherwise under state law, as part
of a settlement of a lawsuit, or as part of their regulations. See supra Part III. This general rule
is accurate in most states and under federal case law.
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regard to the hierarchy of areas that receive varying degrees of
protection under the Fourth Amendment.
The question becomes whether courts should have enough faith
in the legitimacy of consent searches to allow them to overcome the
strong presumption of granting individuals more privacy in certain
locations. Exceptions based on the safety of officers, safety of the
public, or decisions that are well-grounded and judicially-
countenanced ex ante provide a fair argument for abrogating the
location distinction, even though, as seen above, they do not do so to
the extent that consent searches do. However, given the concerns
raised by the Milgram and Bickman studies, there is evidence that
consent is not a reliable enough basis upon which to ignore the
hierarchy of privacy.346
VI. CONCLUSION
Consent searches are a valid and effective tool of law
enforcement. However, the manner in which their validity is
currently decided ignores the different levels of privacy that a person
may expect depending on the circumstances of the search and does not
comport with the privacy analysis employed in other areas of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. A change in the analysis of validity of
consent searches will create more robust protection of privacy
interests in those situations in which courts have determined that
constitutional privacy interests are heightened. Courts should
reaffirm that privacy is an issue in each area of Fourth Amendment
application and that, to reflect this principle and bring the consent
search doctrine into consonance with the rest of search and seizure
law, the test for consent searches should take into account the privacy
expectations of the person searched.
David John Housholder*
346. See supra Part IV.
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